Aruba ClearPass
Overview
Aruba ClearPass is a vendor-agnostic network access control (NAC) and policy management platform by HPE Aruba Networking that automates security compliance and role-based access for all users, devices, and IoT endpoints.
- Vendor: Aruba Networks
- Supported environment: On-Prem
- Detection based on: Telemetry
Configure
Instructions on Sekoia
Configure Your Intake
This section will guide you through creating the intake object in Sekoia, which provides a unique identifier called the "Intake key." The Intake key is essential for later configuration, as it references the Community, Entity, and Parser (Intake Format) used when receiving raw events on Sekoia.
- Go to the Sekoia Intake page.
- Click on the
+ New Intakebutton at the top right of the page. - Search for your Intake by the product name in the search bar.
- Give it a Name and associate it with an Entity (and a Community if using multi-tenant mode).
- Click on
Create.
Note
For more details on how to use the Intake page and to find the Intake key you just created, refer to this documentation.
Configure a forwarder
To forward events using syslog to Sekoia.io, you need to update the syslog header with the intake key you previously created. Here is an example of your message before the forwarder
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG RAW_MESSAGE
<%pri%>1 %timestamp:::date-rfc3339% %hostname% %app-name% %procid% LOG [SEKOIA@53288 intake_key=\"YOUR_INTAKE_KEY\"] RAW_MESSAGE
To achieve this you can:
- Use the Sekoia.io forwarder which is the official supported way to collect data using the syslog protocol in Sekoia.io. In charge of centralizing data coming from many equipments/sources and forwarding them to Sekoia.io with the apporpriated format, it is a prepackaged option. You only have to provide your intake key as parameter.
- Use your own Syslog service instance. Maybe you already have an intance of one of these components on your side and want to reuse it in order to centralize data before forwarding them to Sekoia.io. When using this mode, you have to configure and maintain your component in order to respect the expected Sekoia.io format.
Warning
Only the Sekoia.io forwarder is officially supported. Other options are documented for reference purposes but do not have official support.
Configure Aruba ClearPass syslog server
- Sign in to the ClearPass Policy Manager console.
- Select Administration > External servers > Syslog targets.
- Click Add.
- In the Add syslog target window that appears, specify the following details:
- Host address: enter the syslog concentrator IP address.
- Server port: enter the syslog concentrator port number.
- Protocol: select UDP (you can also select TCP, depending on your syslog concentrator configuration).
- Click Save.
Configure syslog export filters
- Go to Administration > External servers > Syslog export filters.
- Click Add.
- In the Add Syslog Filters window that appears, specify the following in the General tab:
- Name: enter the syslog export filter name based on the table in Export template items.
- Export template: select the appropriate export template based on the table in Export template items.
- Export event format type: select CEF.
- Syslog servers: select the syslog concentrator IP address.
- In the Export template list, when you select the Session or Insight export templates, the Filter and columns tab is enabled. Complete the following steps:
- Click the Filter and columns tab.
- Data filter: make sure the default value All requests is selected.
- Column selection: select the predefined field groups you want to get.
- Click the Summary tab.
- Click Save.
- In the Export template list, when you select the System events and Audit records export templates, the Filter and columns tab is not enabled. Proceed to the Summary tab and click Save.
- Repeat steps to add syslog export filters for all Session, Insight, Audit records and System events export templates based on the details from the table in Export template items.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|3002|Syslog Export Data| 2|rt=Aug 01 2016 11:16:32 fname=Intel Radius Authenication cat=Audit Records duser=admin dvc=192.0.2.10 act=REMOVE
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|1009|Endpoints|1| dmac=020000000001 cs6=Acme Inc. cs6Label=Endpoint.MAC-Vendor dst=192.0.2.10 duser=johndoe cs3=Computer cs3Label=Endpoint.Device-Category cs4=Linux cs4Label=Endpoint.Device-Family cs5=Linux Computer cs5Label=Endpoint.Device-Name ArubaClearpassEndpointConflict=f ArubaClearpassEndpointStatus=Known deviceCustomDate1=Aug 03 2016 14:31:54 deviceCustomDate1Label=Endpoint.Added-At rt=Aug 11 2016 14:56:52 dvc=198.51.100.20 cat=Insight Logs
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.11.14.265169|1003|TACACS Authentication|5|cat=Insight Logs dvc=192.0.2.10 duser=JOHNDOE cs2=TACACS_AUTHORIZATION cs2Label=Request Type src=198.51.100.20 cs6=Example R9 cs6Label=Tacacs Service cs3=REDACTED cs3Label=Authentication Source dpriv=[User Authenticated] cs5=ANONYMIZED cs5Label=Enforcement Profiles cs4=0 cs4Label=Privilege Level destinationServiceName=REDACTED ArubaClearpassTacacsCommand=shell exec ArubaClearpassCppmNodeCPPM=EXAMPLE.example.invalid cn3=0 cn3Label=CPPM Error Code ArubaClearpassCppmErrorCodeErrorCodeDetails=Success
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|2006|Guest Access|1| duser=johndoe dmac=020000000001 dpriv=[User Authenticated] cs2=UNKNOWN cs2Label=System Posture Token outcome=[Allow Access Profile] rt=Aug 10 2016 15:16:51 dvc=192.0.2.10 cat=Session Logs
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.11.14.265169|2000|Logged in users|1|cat=Session Logs dvc=192.0.2.10 duser=JOHNDOE destinationServiceName=REDACTED Y0 dpriv=[User Authenticated] src=198.51.100.20 rt=Aug 21 2026 04:59:39
CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|4009|restart|1| dvc=192.0.2.10 deviceProcessName=Policy server outcome=Success rt=Aug 23 2016 16:55:23 cat=ClearPassSystemEvents
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Aruba Clearpass. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Aruba Clearpass on ATT&CK Navigator
Account Added To A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has added a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4728)
- Effort: master
Account Removed From A Security Enabled Group
Detection in order to investigate who has removed a specific Domain User in Domain Admins or Group Policy Creator Owners (Security event 4729)
- Effort: master
Active Directory Data Export Using Csvde
Detects the use of Csvde, a command-line tool from Windows Server that can be used to export Active Directory data to CSV files. This export doesn't include password hashes, but can be used as a discovery tool to enumerate users, machines and group memberships.
- Effort: elementary
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Adexplorer Usage
Detects the usage of Adexplorer, a legitimate tool from the Sysinternals suite that could be abused by attackers as it can saves snapshots of the Active Directory Database.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2017-11882 Microsoft Office Equation Editor Vulnerability
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The Microsoft Office Equation Editor has no reason to do a network request or drop an executable file. This requires a sysmon configuration with file and network events.
- Effort: master
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names
Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Computer Account Deleted
Detects computer account deletion.
- Effort: master
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
DNS Query For Iplookup
Detects dns query of observables tagged as iplookup.
- Effort: master
Domain Trust Created Or Removed
A trust was created or removed to a domain. An attacker could perform that in order to do lateral movement easily between domains or shutdown the ability of two domains to communicate.
- Effort: advanced
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Enable Root Account With Dsenableroot
Detects when root is enabled. Attackers can use this as a mean of persistence since root is disabled by default.
- Effort: elementary
Exfiltration And Tunneling Tools Execution
Execution of well known tools for data exfiltration and tunneling
- Effort: advanced
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
HackTools Suspicious Names
Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.
- Effort: advanced
Kernel Module Alteration
Kernel module installation can be used to configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. The prerequisites are to enable monitoring of the finit_module, init_module, delete_module syscalls using Auditbeat.
- Effort: advanced
Network Scanning and Discovery
Tools and command lines used for network discovery from current system
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing
List of common tools used for network packages sniffing
- Effort: advanced
Network Sniffing Windows
Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Password Change On Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) Account
The Directory Service Restore Mode (DSRM) account is a local administrator account on Domain Controllers. Attackers may change the password to gain persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool
- Effort: elementary
Possible Replay Attack
This event can be a sign of Kerberos replay attack or, among other things, network device configuration or routing problems.
- Effort: master
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
RDP Session Discovery
Detects use of RDP session discovery via qwinsta or quser. Used by some threat actors to know if someone is working via RDP on a server.
- Effort: advanced
RTLO Character
Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Double Extension
Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spearphishing campaigns
- Effort: advanced
System Info Discovery
System info discovery, attempt to detects basic command use to fingerprint a host.
- Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
User Account Created
Detects user creation on windows servers, which shouldn't happen in an Active Directory environment. Apply this on your windows server logs and not on your DC logs. One default account defaultuser0 is excluded as only used during Windows set-up. This detection use Security Event ID 4720.
- Effort: master
User Account Deleted
Detects local user deletion
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Network device logs |
None |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | `` |
| Category | authentication, configuration, host, process |
| Type | change, creation, deletion, info |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|3002|Syslog Export Data| 2|rt=Aug 01 2016 11:16:32 fname=Intel Radius Authenication cat=Audit Records duser=admin dvc=192.0.2.10 act=REMOVE",
"event": {
"action": "REMOVE",
"category": [
"configuration"
],
"code": "3002",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.audit",
"severity": 2,
"type": [
"deletion"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-08-01T11:16:32Z",
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "Audit Records",
"name": "Syslog Export Data",
"object_name": "Intel Radius Authenication"
}
},
"observer": {
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.6.1.84176"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10"
],
"user": [
"admin"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "admin"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|1009|Endpoints|1| dmac=020000000001 cs6=Acme Inc. cs6Label=Endpoint.MAC-Vendor dst=192.0.2.10 duser=johndoe cs3=Computer cs3Label=Endpoint.Device-Category cs4=Linux cs4Label=Endpoint.Device-Family cs5=Linux Computer cs5Label=Endpoint.Device-Name ArubaClearpassEndpointConflict=f ArubaClearpassEndpointStatus=Known deviceCustomDate1=Aug 03 2016 14:31:54 deviceCustomDate1Label=Endpoint.Added-At rt=Aug 11 2016 14:56:52 dvc=198.51.100.20 cat=Insight Logs",
"event": {
"category": [
"host"
],
"code": "1009",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.insight",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-08-11T14:56:52Z",
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "Insight Logs",
"endpoint": {
"added_at": "2016-08-03T14:31:54Z",
"conflict": false,
"device_category": "Computer",
"device_name": "Linux Computer",
"mac_vendor": "Acme Inc.",
"status": "Known"
},
"name": "Endpoints"
}
},
"destination": {
"address": "192.0.2.10",
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"mac": "02:00:00:00:00:01"
},
"host": {
"os": {
"family": "Linux"
}
},
"observer": {
"ip": "198.51.100.20",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.6.1.84176"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10",
"198.51.100.20"
],
"user": [
"johndoe"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "johndoe"
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.11.14.265169|1003|TACACS Authentication|5|cat=Insight Logs dvc=192.0.2.10 duser=JOHNDOE cs2=TACACS_AUTHORIZATION cs2Label=Request Type src=198.51.100.20 cs6=Example R9 cs6Label=Tacacs Service cs3=REDACTED cs3Label=Authentication Source dpriv=[User Authenticated] cs5=ANONYMIZED cs5Label=Enforcement Profiles cs4=0 cs4Label=Privilege Level destinationServiceName=REDACTED ArubaClearpassTacacsCommand=shell exec ArubaClearpassCppmNodeCPPM=EXAMPLE.example.invalid cn3=0 cn3Label=CPPM Error Code ArubaClearpassCppmErrorCodeErrorCodeDetails=Success",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "1003",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.insight",
"severity": 5,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "Insight Logs",
"name": "TACACS Authentication"
}
},
"observer": {
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.11.14.265169"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10",
"198.51.100.20"
],
"user": [
"JOHNDOE"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "198.51.100.20",
"ip": "198.51.100.20"
},
"user": {
"name": "JOHNDOE",
"roles": [
"User Authenticated"
]
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|2006|Guest Access|1| duser=johndoe dmac=020000000001 dpriv=[User Authenticated] cs2=UNKNOWN cs2Label=System Posture Token outcome=[Allow Access Profile] rt=Aug 10 2016 15:16:51 dvc=192.0.2.10 cat=Session Logs",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "2006",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.session",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-08-10T15:16:51Z",
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "Session Logs",
"enforcement_profile": "[Allow Access Profile]",
"name": "Guest Access",
"system_posture_token": "UNKNOWN"
}
},
"destination": {
"mac": "02:00:00:00:00:01"
},
"observer": {
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.6.1.84176"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10"
],
"user": [
"johndoe"
]
},
"user": {
"name": "johndoe",
"roles": [
"User Authenticated"
]
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.11.14.265169|2000|Logged in users|1|cat=Session Logs dvc=192.0.2.10 duser=JOHNDOE destinationServiceName=REDACTED Y0 dpriv=[User Authenticated] src=198.51.100.20 rt=Aug 21 2026 04:59:39",
"event": {
"category": [
"authentication"
],
"code": "2000",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.session",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2026-08-21T04:59:39Z",
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "Session Logs",
"name": "Logged in users"
}
},
"observer": {
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.11.14.265169"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10",
"198.51.100.20"
],
"user": [
"JOHNDOE"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "198.51.100.20",
"ip": "198.51.100.20"
},
"user": {
"name": "JOHNDOE",
"roles": [
"User Authenticated"
]
}
}
{
"message": "CEF:0|Aruba Networks|ClearPass|6.6.1.84176|4009|restart|1| dvc=192.0.2.10 deviceProcessName=Policy server outcome=Success rt=Aug 23 2016 16:55:23 cat=ClearPassSystemEvents",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"code": "4009",
"dataset": "aruba-clearpass.system",
"outcome": "success",
"severity": 1,
"type": [
"info"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2016-08-23T16:55:23Z",
"aruba": {
"clearpass": {
"category": "ClearPassSystemEvents",
"name": "restart"
}
},
"observer": {
"ip": "192.0.2.10",
"product": "ClearPass",
"vendor": "Aruba Networks",
"version": "6.6.1.84176"
},
"process": {
"name": "Policy server"
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"192.0.2.10"
]
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
aruba.clearpass.category |
keyword |
Event category |
aruba.clearpass.endpoint.added_at |
datetime |
Timestamp when a device is added |
aruba.clearpass.endpoint.device_category |
keyword |
Device category |
aruba.clearpass.endpoint.device_name |
keyword |
Device name |
aruba.clearpass.endpoint.mac_vendor |
keyword |
MAC vendor |
aruba.clearpass.endpoint.status |
keyword |
Status |
aruba.clearpass.enforcement_profile |
keyword |
Enforcement profile |
aruba.clearpass.name |
keyword |
Event name |
aruba.clearpass.object_name |
keyword |
Name of the configuration object targeted by an audit record |
aruba.clearpass.system_posture_token |
keyword |
System posture token |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.mac |
keyword |
MAC address of the destination. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.code |
keyword |
Identification code for this event. |
event.dataset |
keyword |
Name of the dataset. |
event.outcome |
keyword |
The outcome of the event. The lowest level categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
host.os.family |
keyword |
OS family (such as redhat, debian, freebsd, windows). |
observer.ip |
ip |
IP addresses of the observer. |
observer.product |
keyword |
The product name of the observer. |
observer.vendor |
keyword |
Vendor name of the observer. |
observer.version |
keyword |
Observer version. |
process.name |
keyword |
Process name. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
user.name |
keyword |
Short name or login of the user. |
user.roles |
keyword |
Array of user roles at the time of the event. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.