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Cisco Secure Access - Web

Overview

The Cisco Secure Access Web logs show your organization's traffic through the Secure Access proxy.

  • Vendor: Cisco
  • Supported environment: Cloud
  • Detection based on: Telemetry

Warning

Important note - This format is currently in beta. We highly value your feedback to improve its performance.

Configure

This section will guide you through configuring Cisco Secure Access to forward logs to Sekoia.io using a Cisco-managed Amazon S3 bucket.

Prerequisites

  • Full Admin user role in Cisco Secure Access. For more information, see the Manage Accounts documentation.
  • Access to Sekoia.io Intakes and Playbook pages with write permissions.

Step 1 — Configure the Cisco-Managed S3 Bucket

Cisco Secure Access can export your logs to a Cisco-managed Amazon S3 bucket. Cisco configures all managed buckets to use Amazon Server-Side Encryption with S3-Managed Keys (SSE-S3, AES-256). Access is provided via AWS IAM credentials.

  1. In the Cisco Secure Access dashboard, navigate to Admin > Log Management.
  2. Click Set up cloud storage and select Cisco.

  3. Select a Region — choose the region closest to you to minimize latency when downloading logs.

    Warning

    The selected region cannot be changed later without deleting your current settings and starting over. Not all AWS regions are available.

  4. Select a Retention Duration — choose 7, 14, or 30 days.

    Note

    Beyond the selected time period, all data is purged and cannot be retrieved. A shorter duration is recommended if your ingestion cycle is frequent.

  5. Click Save. Cisco Secure Access activates log export to the S3 bucket. When activation is complete, the Amazon S3 Summary page appears.

  6. Copy the Access Key and Secret Key and store them in a safe place.

    Warning

    The Access Key and Secret Key are displayed only once. If you lose them, you must regenerate them by rotating the keys in Cisco Secure Access.

  7. Click Done.

Step 2 — Create the Intake

Configure Your Intake

This section will guide you through creating the intake object in Sekoia, which provides a unique identifier called the "Intake key." The Intake key is essential for later configuration, as it references the Community, Entity, and Parser (Intake Format) used when receiving raw events on Sekoia.

  1. Go to the Sekoia Intake page.
  2. Click on the + New Intake button at the top right of the page.
  3. Search for your Intake by the product name in the search bar.
  4. Give it a Name and associate it with an Entity (and a Community if using multi-tenant mode).
  5. Click on Create.

Note

For more details on how to use the Intake page and to find the Intake key you just created, refer to this documentation.

Step 3 — Configure the Connector

Configure Your Playbook

This section will assist you in pulling remote logs from Sekoia and sending them to the intake you previously created.

  1. Go to the Sekoia playbook page.
  2. Click on the + New playbook button at the top right of the page.
  3. Select Create a playbook from scratch, and click Next.
  4. Give it a Name and a Description, and click Next.
  5. Choose a trigger from the list by searching for the name of the product, and click Create.
  6. A new Playbook page will be displayed. Click on the module in the center of the page, then click on the Configure icon.
  7. On the right panel, click on the Configuration tab.
  8. Select an existing Trigger Configuration (from the account menu) or create a new one by clicking on + Create new configuration.
  9. Configure the Trigger based on the Actions Library (for instance, see here for AWS modules), then click Save.
  10. Click on Save at the top right of the playbook page.
  11. Activate the playbook by clicking on the "On / Off" toggle button at the top right corner of the page.

When selecting the trigger, choose Fetch new logs on S3 (without SQS).

Before configuring the connector, retrieve the Data path from the Cisco Secure Access Amazon S3 Summary page. It looks like this:

s3://cisco-managed-eu-central-1/1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0

From this path:

  • the bucket name is the first segment after s3:// — here, cisco-managed-eu-central-1.
  • the base prefix is the second segment — here, 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0. Cisco stores each log type in a dedicated subfolder under this prefix.

In the connector configuration, set the following fields:

  • AWS Region (aws_region_name): the region you selected when configuring the S3 bucket in Cisco Secure Access (for example, eu-central-1).
  • AWS Access Key (aws_access_key): the Access Key copied from the Cisco Secure Access Amazon S3 Summary page.
  • AWS Secret Access Key (aws_secret_access_key): the Secret Key copied from the Cisco Secure Access Amazon S3 Summary page.
  • Bucket (bucket): the bucket name extracted from the Data path (for example, cisco-managed-eu-central-1).
  • Prefix filter (prefix_filter): the base prefix followed by the subfolder matching the log type you want to collect. Since the bucket holds several log types, this filter ensures the connector only ingests the logs for this intake.
  • Intake key (intake_key): the intake key generated when you created the intake in Step 2.

Cisco Secure Access stores each log type in a dedicated subfolder under the base prefix. Set the Prefix filter to <base_prefix>/<subfolder>, using the subfolder that matches the intake you are configuring:

Intake Subfolder Example prefix filter
Cisco Secure Access - DNS dnslogs 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0/dnslogs
Cisco Secure Access - Web proxylogs 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0/proxylogs
Cisco Secure Access - Cloud Firewall firewalllogs 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0/firewalllogs
Cisco Secure Access - IPS intrusionlogs 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0/intrusionlogs
Cisco Secure Access - File Events fileeventlogs 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0/fileeventlogs

Note

Replace 1234567_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0 with the base prefix extracted from your own Cisco Secure Access Data path.

Event Categories

The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.

Data Source Description
Network device logs None

In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.

Name Values
Kind ``
Category network, web
Type access, connection

Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion

This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.

{
    "message": "\"2025-01-06 13:39:24\",\"SIG2-Denver\",\"1.1.1.1\",\"4.4.4.4\",\"4.4.4.4\",\"\",\"ALLOWED\",\"https://example.com\",\"\",\"\",\"200\",\"1557\",\"6441\",\"\",\"\",\"Software/Technology,Allow List,Computers and Internet\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"Network Tunnels\",\"\",\"SIG2-EX,RTO-XXXX-SIG\",\"Network Tunnels,Internal Networks\",\"CONNECT\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"13368132\",\"610352\",\"9999583\",\"not_isolated\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"\",\"nginx-proxy-abc123.example.net\",\"DEN1\",\"true\",\"winatp-gw-eus.microsoft.com\",\"false\",\"false\",\"\",\"\",\"REDACTED\",\"\",\"\",\"3.3.3.3\",\"deepseek-v3\",\"Prohibited Suppliers, Copyleft License\",\"e846afe0f3c8a87f\"",
    "event": {
        "action": "allowed",
        "category": [
            "network",
            "web"
        ],
        "dataset": "web",
        "outcome": [
            "success"
        ],
        "type": [
            "access",
            "connection"
        ]
    },
    "@timestamp": "2025-01-06T13:39:24Z",
    "cisco_secure_access": {
        "web": {
            "ai_model_name": "deepseek-v3",
            "ai_supply_chain_categories": [
                "Copyleft License",
                "Prohibited Suppliers"
            ],
            "categories": [
                "Allow List",
                "Computers and Internet",
                "Software/Technology"
            ],
            "data_center": "DEN1",
            "destination_list_ids": [
                "9999583"
            ],
            "egress": true,
            "egress_ip": "3.3.3.3",
            "event_correlation_id": "e846afe0f3c8a87f",
            "identities": [
                "RTO-XXXX-SIG",
                "SIG2-EX"
            ],
            "identity_types": [
                "Internal Networks",
                "Network Tunnels"
            ],
            "isolate_action": "not_isolated",
            "policy_identity_label": "SIG2-Denver",
            "policy_identity_type": "Network Tunnels",
            "security_overridden": false,
            "time_based_rule": false
        }
    },
    "destination": {
        "address": "example.com",
        "domain": "example.com",
        "ip": "4.4.4.4",
        "registered_domain": "example.com",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    },
    "host": {
        "hostname": "nginx-proxy-abc123.example.net",
        "name": "nginx-proxy-abc123.example.net"
    },
    "http": {
        "request": {
            "bytes": 1557,
            "method": "CONNECT"
        },
        "response": {
            "bytes": 6441,
            "status_code": 200
        }
    },
    "observer": {
        "product": "Secure Access",
        "type": "proxy",
        "vendor": "Cisco"
    },
    "organization": {
        "id": "REDACTED"
    },
    "related": {
        "hosts": [
            "example.com",
            "nginx-proxy-abc123.example.net"
        ],
        "ip": [
            "1.1.1.1",
            "4.4.4.4"
        ]
    },
    "rule": {
        "id": "610352",
        "ruleset": "13368132"
    },
    "source": {
        "address": "1.1.1.1",
        "ip": "1.1.1.1",
        "nat": {
            "ip": "4.4.4.4"
        }
    },
    "tls": {
        "client": {
            "server_name": "winatp-gw-eus.microsoft.com"
        }
    },
    "url": {
        "domain": "example.com",
        "full": "https://example.com",
        "original": "https://example.com",
        "port": 443,
        "registered_domain": "example.com",
        "scheme": "https",
        "top_level_domain": "com"
    }
}

Extracted Fields

The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.

Name Type Description
@timestamp date Date/time when the event originated.
cisco_secure_access.web.ai_model_name keyword Indicates the name of the AI model involved in the transaction or event.
cisco_secure_access.web.ai_supply_chain_categories keyword The list of AI supply chain categories associated with the event.
cisco_secure_access.web.amp.disposition keyword The status of the files proxied and scanned by Cisco Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) as part of the File Inspection feature.
cisco_secure_access.web.amp.malware_name keyword If Malicious, the name of the malware according to AMP.
cisco_secure_access.web.amp.score keyword The score of the malware from AMP.
cisco_secure_access.web.application_entity_category keyword It represents the classification grouping of application entities based on shared characteristics or functions.
cisco_secure_access.web.application_entity_name keyword It refers to the specific name of an application entity within a system. For example, the YouTube Channel "Cisco".
cisco_secure_access.web.application_ids keyword The ID of the destination application.
cisco_secure_access.web.av_detections keyword The detection name according to the antivirus engine used in file inspection.
cisco_secure_access.web.blocked_categories keyword The category that resulted in the destination being blocked.
cisco_secure_access.web.categories keyword The security categories for this request, such as Malware.
cisco_secure_access.web.certificate_errors keyword Any certificate or protocol errors in the request.
cisco_secure_access.web.data_center keyword The name of the data center that processed the user-generated traffic.
cisco_secure_access.web.destination_list_ids keyword The ID number assigned to a destination list.
cisco_secure_access.web.detected_response_file_type keyword The file type that resulted in a blocked response.
cisco_secure_access.web.dlp_status keyword If the request was Blocked for DLP.
cisco_secure_access.web.egress boolean TRUE indicates that the egress IP was a reserved IP.
cisco_secure_access.web.egress_ip ip The public IP address assigned to a session as it exits the Secure Access ZTA infrastructure en route to the destination application.
cisco_secure_access.web.event_correlation_id keyword A unique identifier generated for each network request, the Event Correlation ID stitches together all related events across various security services (Firewall, SWG, ZTNA) to provide a unified, end-to-end view of a single traffic flow.
cisco_secure_access.web.file_action keyword The action taken on a file in a remote browser isolation session.
cisco_secure_access.web.forwarding_method keyword The method used to forward the proxy events.
cisco_secure_access.web.identities keyword All identities associated with this request.
cisco_secure_access.web.identity_types keyword The type of identities that were associated with the request.
cisco_secure_access.web.isolate_action keyword The remote browser isolation state associated with the request.
cisco_secure_access.web.msp_organization_id keyword The Secure Access parent organization ID.
cisco_secure_access.web.policy_identity_label keyword The identity that made the request.
cisco_secure_access.web.policy_identity_type keyword The first identity type that made the request.
cisco_secure_access.web.producer keyword The producer of the proxy events.
cisco_secure_access.web.puas keyword A list of all potentially unwanted application (PUA) results for the proxied file as returned by the antivirus scanner.
cisco_secure_access.web.security_overridden boolean TRUE indicates that security filtering was explicitly overridden and not applied during enforcement.
cisco_secure_access.web.time_based_rule boolean TRUE indicates that a the rule was applied due to a time condition.
cisco_secure_access.web.warn_categories keyword The ID of one or more content categories in lists matched for a Warn action by the rule.
cisco_secure_access.web.warn_status keyword The Warn page's state associated with the request.
destination.domain keyword The domain name of the destination.
destination.geo.country_iso_code keyword Country ISO code.
destination.ip ip IP address of the destination.
event.action keyword The action captured by the event.
event.category keyword Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy.
event.dataset keyword Name of the dataset.
event.type keyword Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy.
file.hash.sha256 keyword SHA256 hash.
file.name keyword Name of the file including the extension, without the directory.
host.hostname keyword Hostname of the host.
host.name keyword Name of the host.
http.request.bytes long Total size in bytes of the request (body and headers).
http.request.method keyword HTTP request method.
http.request.referrer keyword Referrer for this HTTP request.
http.response.body.bytes long Size in bytes of the response body.
http.response.bytes long Total size in bytes of the response (body and headers).
http.response.mime_type keyword Mime type of the body of the response.
http.response.status_code long HTTP response status code.
observer.product keyword The product name of the observer.
observer.type keyword The type of the observer the data is coming from.
observer.vendor keyword Vendor name of the observer.
organization.id keyword Unique identifier for the organization.
rule.id keyword Rule ID
rule.ruleset keyword Rule ruleset
source.ip ip IP address of the source.
source.nat.ip ip Source NAT ip
tls.client.server_name keyword Hostname the client is trying to connect to. Also called the SNI.
url.original wildcard Unmodified original url as seen in the event source.
user_agent.original keyword Unparsed user_agent string.

For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.

Detection section

The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.

The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Cisco Secure Access - Web. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.

SEKOIA.IO x Cisco Secure Access - Web on ATT&CK Navigator

Advanced IP Scanner

Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.

  • Effort: master
Burp Suite Tool Detected

Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2018-11776 Apache Struts2

Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16 suffer from possible Remote Code Execution when alwaysSelectFullNamespace is true (either by user or a plugin like Convention Plugin) and then: results are used with no namespace and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace and similar to results, same possibility when using url tag which doesn't have value and action set and in same time, its upper package have no or wildcard namespace.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Fortinet FortiOS CVE-2018-13379. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2018. It is exploited by APT threat actors as well as cybercriminals. The exploitation of this CVE lead an unauthenticated user to get full access to FortiOS system file through SSL VPN via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. The exploit read /dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession file, that contains login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects FortiOS 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-0604 SharePoint

Detects the exploitation of the SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of the Pulse Secure vulnerability CVE-2019-11510. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2019. It is exploited by diverse threat actors, leading sometimes in ransomware deployement among these groups: Maze, Conti, Egregor, DoppelPaymer, NetWalker and REvil. But also APT actors such as APT29. The exploitation of this CVE allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server. The exploit reads /etc/passwd file to get access to login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 products.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-19781 Citrix NetScaler (ADC)

Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix NetScaler (ADC), Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-2725 Oracle Weblogic Exploit

Detects the successful exploitation of a deserialization vulnerability in Oracle Weblogic Server, CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability affects versions 10.X and 12.1.3 of WebLogic that have the components wls9_async_response.war and wls-wsat.war enabled. It is a remote code execution which can be exploited without authentication via HTTP. An HTTP response status code = 202, means the target is vulnerable, the analyst then has to look in depth to check if a webshell has been uploaded or something else has been done.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit

Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-1147 SharePoint

Detection of SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2020-1147.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-14882 Oracle WebLogic Server

Detects the exploitation of the Oracle WebLogic Server vulnerability (CVE-2020-16952).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE

Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempts

Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902.

  • Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access

Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read

Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-21972 VMware vCenter

The vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability in a vCenter Server plugin. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.x before 7.0 U1c, 6.7 before 6.7 U3l and 6.5 before 6.5 U3n) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2 and 3.x before 3.10.1.2). POST request on the following PATH "/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova". If in response body (500) the words it has "uploadFile", that means the vCenter is available to accept files via POST without any restrictions.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-21985 VMware vCenter

The VMware vSphere Client (HTML5) contains a remote code execution vulnerability due to lack of input validation in the Virtual SAN Health Check plug-in which is enabled by default in vCenter Server. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 may exploit this issue to execute commands with unrestricted privileges on the underlying operating system that hosts vCenter Server. This affects VMware vCenter Server (7.0 before 7.0 U2b, 6.7 before 6.7 U3n and 6.5 before 6.5 U3p) and VMware Cloud Foundation (4.x before 4.2.1 and 3.x before 3.10.2.1).

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22123 Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection

Detects Fortinet FortiWeb OS Command Injection (August 2021) vulnerability exploitation attempt. A remote, authenticated attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system hosting a vulnerable FortiWeb WAF by sending a POST request with the command in the name field. At the time of writing this rule, it would appear that the request would respond in code 500 for a successful exploitation attempt.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability

Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.

  • Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-26855 Exchange SSRF

Detects the exploitation of ProyxLogon vulerability on Exchange servers.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell Attempt

Detects CVE-2021-34473 ProxyShell attempt against Microsoft Exchange Server, Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-41773 Apache 2.4.49 Path Traversal

Detects successful exploitation of the Apache Path Traversal CVE-2021-41773.

  • Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-43798 Grafana Directory Traversal

Grafana version 8.x has a 0day arbitrary file read (with no fix yet) based on a directory traversal vulnerability

  • Effort: intermediate
Certify Or Certipy

Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.

  • Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike Default Beacons Names

Detects the default names of Cobalt Strike beacons / payloads.

  • Effort: intermediate
Cobalt Strike HTTP Default GET beaconing

Detects GET HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

  • Effort: advanced
Cobalt Strike HTTP Default POST Beaconing

Detects POST HTTP queries from known Cobalt Strike beacons (source code 4.3)

  • Effort: advanced
Correlation Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 62 characters and requested at least 50 times in a 10 minutes range time. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Covenant Default HTTP Beaconing

Detects potential Covenant communications through the user-agent and specific urls

  • Effort: intermediate
Credential Dump Tools Related Files

Detects processes or file names related to credential dumping tools and the dropped files they generate by default.

  • Effort: advanced
Cryptomining

Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.

  • Effort: master
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers

This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.

  • Effort: elementary
Discord Suspicious Download

Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.

  • Effort: advanced
Dynamic DNS Contacted

Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.

  • Effort: master
EvilProxy Phishing Domain

Detects subdomains potentially generated by the EvilProxy adversary-in-the-middle phishing platform. Inspect the other subdomains of the domain to identify the landing page, and determine if the user submitted credentials. This rule has a small percentage of false positives on legitimate domains.

  • Effort: intermediate
Exfiltration Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.

  • Effort: master
FoggyWeb HTTP Default GET/POST Requests

Detects GET or POST request pattern observed within the first FoggyWeb campaign detected by Microsoft.

  • Effort: advanced
GitLab CVE-2021-22205

Detects GitLab vulnerability CVE-2021-22205 exploitation success. It allows an attacker to do some remote code execution with user git. The HTTP return code 422 indicates a successfull exploitation.

  • Effort: intermediate
HTA Infection Chains

Detect the creation of a ZIP file and an HTA file as it is often used in infection chains. Furthermore it also detects the use of suspicious processes launched by explorer.exe combined with the creation of an HTA file, since it is also often used in infection chains (LNK - HTA for instance).

  • Effort: advanced
HackTools Suspicious Names

Quick-win rule to detect the default process names or file names of several HackTools.

  • Effort: advanced
ISO LNK Infection Chain

Detection of an ISO (or any other similar archive file) downloaded file, followed by a child-process of explorer, which is characteristic of an infection using an ISO containing an LNK file. For events with host.name.

  • Effort: master
Koadic MSHTML Command

Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module

  • Effort: intermediate
LokiBot Default C2 URL

Detects default C2 URL for trojan LokiBot

  • Effort: elementary
Nimbo-C2 User Agent

Nimbo-C2 Uses an unusual User-Agent format in its implants.

  • Effort: intermediate
PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

Detects the execution of the PasswordDump SecurityXploded Tool

  • Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension

Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension

  • Effort: elementary
Potential Bazar Loader User-Agents

Detects potential Bazar loader communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: elementary
Potential DNS Tunnel

Detects domain name which is longer than 62 characters. Long domain names are distinctive of DNS tunnels.

  • Effort: advanced
Potential Lemon Duck User-Agent

Detects LemonDuck user agent. The format used two sets of alphabetical characters separated by dashes, for example "User-Agent: Lemon-Duck-[A-Z]-[A-Z]".

  • Effort: elementary
Potential LokiBot User-Agent

Detects potential LokiBot communications through the user-agent

  • Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)

Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries

  • Effort: elementary
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths

Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.

  • Effort: elementary
RTLO Character

Detects RTLO (Right-To-Left character) in file and process names.

  • Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL

Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.

  • Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain

Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.

  • Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera

Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.

  • Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed

Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.

  • Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io Activity Logs Rule Deactivation Bulk

Detects a massive rule deactivation observed threw Sekoia.io activity logs.

  • Effort: master
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection

Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.

  • Effort: master
SharePoint Authenticated SSRF

Detects succesful SSRF from an authenticated SharePoint user.

  • Effort: elementary
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services

Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.

  • Effort: intermediate
Suspicious File Name

Detects suspicious file name possibly linked to malicious tool.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys File Created In Tmp

Detects the creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file in the application-data local temporary folder. This driver is used by Sysinternals Process Explorer but also by KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU) or Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU. Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious TOR Gateway

Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: advanced
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign

Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.

  • Effort: intermediate
TOR Usage Generic Rule

Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.

  • Effort: master
Telegram Bot API Request

Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind

  • Effort: advanced
TrevorC2 HTTP Communication

Detects TrevorC2 HTTP communication based on the HTTP request URI and the user-agent.

  • Effort: elementary
WCE wceaux.dll Creation

Detects wceaux.dll creation while Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) is executed.

  • Effort: intermediate