Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE)
Overview
Google Cloud Logging centralizes logs from Google Cloud products.
In this documentation, you will learn how to collect and send Google Cloud logs to SEKOIA.IO.
Configure
Before you begin working with PubSub, verify that you have the right permission.
Follow Google's documentation to configure a dedicated PubSub receiver. At the end of the documentation you should have done the following:
- Setup a project
- Create a topic
- Add a subscription (you should have the role
logging.adminexplicitly set on your account; for more information, see associated documentation) - Try your setup by publishing a message to the topic
Next, create a dedicated service account. At the end of the documentation you should have done the following:
- Create a service account with the role
Pub/Sub Subscriber
Note
To successfully activate the playbook further down this page, ensure the user has been granted the Pub/Sub Subscriber role for both the Topic and Subscription pages. Failure to do so will result in an error with status code 403.
- Create and download JSON keys (service account credentials)
You should now have:
- A credentials file
- A project ID
- A subscription ID
To pull events, you have to:
- Go to the intake's page
- Click on
+New intakesto create a new intake
This intake consumes records from Google Pubsub and pushes them to Sekoia.io.
Fields description
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| name | Configuration name |
| auth_provider_x509_cert_url | The URL of the public x509 certificate, used to verify the signature on JWTs, such as ID tokens, signed by the authentication provider. https://wwww.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/certs |
| auth_url | Google authentification url https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth |
| client_email | Client email |
| client_id | Client id |
| client_x509_cert_url | The URL of the public x509 certificate, used to verify JWTs signed by the client |
| private_key | Private key |
| private_key_id | Private key id |
| project_id | Project id |
| token_uri | token server endpoint URI https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token |
| type | Activity type service_account |
| universe_domain | The domain name of the Google Cloud Services provider (default to googleapis.com, i.e Google Cloud Platform) |
To start sending Logs to SEKOIA.IO, please create a Logs Router Sinks with an Inclusion Filter that fits your needs (Read the documentation dedicated to the product you want to monitor).
Last configuration on Google to setup is describe on each Intake.
Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) configuration
There are different types of logs produced by GKE:
Auditd logs: Most important logs from a security point of view. We recommend that you use Auditbeat to collect Auditd logs.
Flow Logs: From Google VPC FLow Logs documentation:
VPC Flow Logs records a sample of network flows sent from and received by VM instances, including instances used as GKE nodes. These logs can be used for network monitoring, forensics, real-time security analysis, and expense optimization.
Please read the dedicated documentation. (Intake type: Google VPC Flow Logs)
Activity logs (Intake type: Google Cloud Audit log):
- operations done on GCP cluster resources (create a cluster, etc.)
resource.type: gke_cluster - operations done on Kubernetes objects “inside” clusters (Kubernetes Audit Policy)
resource.type: k8s_cluster
Event logs: Kubernetes events are objects that provide insight into what is happening inside a cluster, such as what decisions were made by the scheduler or why some pods were evicted from the node log_id("events") (Intake type: Google Cloud Audit log)
Node logs: Services running on GKE nodes (kubelet, node problem detector, container runtime, etc.) emit their own logs resource.type: k8s_node
Container logs: Container stdout and stderr streams log_id("stdout") log_id("stderr")
Instance logs: Serial console output log_id("serialconsole.googleapis.com/serial_port_1_output")
To learn more, consult the following resources:
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
{
"insertId": "mf28fmdkt05bbyjk",
"jsonPayload": {
"_CAP_EFFECTIVE": "1ffffffffff",
"_BOOT_ID": "e61a95dc40fd44f6ba5c6bfcb18b46a2",
"_SYSTEMD_CGROUP": "/system.slice/containerd.service",
"_PID": "1478",
"_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID": "ebd8a874b9bf4797a358a0403ec7e1e7",
"_EXE": "/usr/bin/containerd",
"_TRANSPORT": "stdout",
"_SYSTEMD_SLICE": "system.slice",
"MESSAGE": "time=\"2022-06-01T14:01:35.371006269Z\" level=info msg=\"StopContainer for \\\"4c2b21624d4488ea8305bec91bb58135e840ab50b779da3db19ddf87864a760e\\\" with timeout 30 (s)\"",
"_CMDLINE": "/usr/bin/containerd",
"_STREAM_ID": "949cd6779ed34897a1b74883881ddfe8",
"_HOSTNAME": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7",
"_COMM": "containerd",
"SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER": "containerd",
"_MACHINE_ID": "3fa273bf9f602a2286f55eac7ffa6d36",
"_GID": "0",
"_SYSTEMD_UNIT": "containerd.service",
"PRIORITY": "6",
"SYSLOG_FACILITY": "3",
"_UID": "0"
},
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_node",
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413",
"node_name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7",
"location": "europe-west1-c"
}
},
"timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:01:35.371492Z",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/container-runtime",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:01:36.219094561Z"
}
{
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74y6",
"jsonPayload": {
"reportingComponent": "",
"reason": "Pulling",
"eventTime": null,
"reportingInstance": "",
"kind": "Event",
"message": "Pulling image \"gke.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd:v0.11.3-gke.0\"",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"type": "Normal",
"source": {
"host": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7",
"component": "kubelet"
},
"metadata": {
"resourceVersion": "954",
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z",
"namespace": "kube-system",
"managedFields": [
{
"manager": "kubelet",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:message": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:source": {
"f:host": {},
"f:component": {}
},
"f:type": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {}
},
"operation": "Update",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z"
}
],
"uid": "658b3d26-ed26-4d32-a5b4-3bb87bdefa99",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6.16f48435f72a4bd9"
},
"involvedObject": {
"resourceVersion": "6551",
"namespace": "kube-system",
"fieldPath": "spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"uid": "52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf",
"kind": "Pod"
}
},
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_pod",
"labels": {
"location": "europe-west1-c",
"namespace_name": "kube-system",
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"pod_name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z",
"severity": "INFO",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z"
}
{
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74yc",
"jsonPayload": {
"eventTime": null,
"reportingInstance": "",
"type": "Warning",
"reportingComponent": "",
"metadata": {
"resourceVersion": "960",
"name": "kube-dns.16f484369d214dae",
"namespace": "kube-system",
"uid": "828b8cd3-1eec-4093-95fb-907ebeab0efa",
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"operation": "Update",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:count": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:type": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {}
}
},
"manager": "kube-controller-manager",
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1"
}
]
},
"apiVersion": "v1",
"kind": "Event",
"message": "Failed to update endpoint kube-system/kube-dns: Operation cannot be fulfilled on endpoints \"kube-dns\": the object has been modified; please apply your changes to the latest version and try again",
"source": {
"component": "endpoint-controller"
},
"involvedObject": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"uid": "75cc3b54-2a5f-42fa-8dd9-1669695113cd",
"kind": "Endpoints",
"namespace": "kube-system",
"resourceVersion": "7416",
"name": "kube-dns"
},
"reason": "FailedToUpdateEndpoint"
},
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_cluster",
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"location": "europe-west1-c",
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z",
"severity": "WARNING",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z"
}
{
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74yb",
"jsonPayload": {
"involvedObject": {
"namespace": "kube-system",
"uid": "52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf",
"kind": "Pod",
"resourceVersion": "6551",
"fieldPath": "spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6"
},
"kind": "Event",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"eventTime": null,
"reportingInstance": "",
"metadata": {
"managedFields": [
{
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z",
"manager": "kubelet",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"operation": "Update",
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:type": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {},
"f:host": {}
},
"f:reason": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {}
}
}
],
"namespace": "kube-system",
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6.16f48436899e3f4a",
"resourceVersion": "959",
"uid": "2836bb34-8703-4475-a7d8-5cf0ec2232f8"
},
"message": "Created container prometheus-to-sd",
"reason": "Created",
"type": "Normal",
"source": {
"host": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7",
"component": "kubelet"
},
"reportingComponent": ""
},
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_pod",
"labels": {
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413",
"namespace_name": "kube-system",
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"pod_name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"location": "europe-west1-c"
}
},
"timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z",
"severity": "INFO",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z"
}
{
"insertId": "32ez47f5wz17i",
"jsonPayload": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"eventTime": null,
"involvedObject": {
"kind": "Node",
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf",
"uid": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf"
},
"kind": "Event",
"message": "{\"unmanaged\": {\"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_buckets\": \"32768\"}}",
"metadata": {
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {},
"f:host": {}
},
"f:type": {}
},
"manager": "node-problem-detector",
"operation": "Update",
"time": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z"
}
],
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf.16f8813a8514b8c0",
"namespace": "default",
"resourceVersion": "894",
"uid": "7e26b736-331a-4896-961f-96688918ba7e"
},
"reason": "NodeSysctlChange",
"reportingComponent": "",
"reportingInstance": "",
"source": {
"component": "sysctl-monitor",
"host": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf"
},
"type": "Warning"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:52.012275121Z",
"resource": {
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"location": "europe-central2-a",
"node_name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf",
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413"
},
"type": "k8s_node"
},
"severity": "WARNING",
"timestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z"
}
{
"insertId": "1wtrhknf2gg14w",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-16T09:42:59.259491841Z",
"resource": {
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster-1",
"location": "europe-central2-a",
"project_id": "hazel-aria-348413"
},
"type": "k8s_cluster"
},
"severity": "WARNING",
"textPayload": "Event exporter started watching. Some events may have been lost up to this point.",
"timestamp": "2022-06-16T09:42:39.200653463Z"
}
{
"insertId": "1111111111111111",
"jsonPayload": {
"additional": {
"pixyl-analysis-id": "analysis-1111111-1"
},
"context": "default",
"logger": "ai.gleamer.inference.core.wlm.ReaderThread.pixyl_loggers.loggers.GleamerJSONFormatter",
"message": "{1: 1}",
"thread": "W-8081-Thread-stdout"
},
"labels": {
"compute.googleapis.com/resource_name": "gtest-resource",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/managed-by": "Manager",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/name": "test-integration-eu-3-3-0",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/version": "3.3.0",
"k8s-pod/gleamer_ai/connector-name": "test-integration-eu",
"k8s-pod/gleamer_ai/connector-version": "3.3.0",
"k8s-pod/manager_sh/chart": "app-0.1.0",
"k8s-pod/pod-template-hash": "1111111111",
"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_name": "test-integration-eu-3-3-0",
"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_type": "Deployment"
},
"logName": "projects/test/logs/stdout",
"receiveTimestamp": "2026-03-09T08:20:46.852786133Z",
"resource": {
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster-primary",
"container_name": "app",
"location": "europe-west1",
"namespace_name": "connector",
"pod_name": "test-integration-eu-3-3-0-1111111111-hq6kl",
"project_id": "test"
},
"type": "k8s_container"
},
"severity": "INFO",
"timestamp": "2026-03-09T08:20:43.016224684Z"
}
{
"insertId": "1111111111111111",
"jsonPayload": {
"hostName": "host-name",
"loggerName": "logger.test.Integration",
"mdc": {
"messageId": "11111111111111111",
"subscription": "projects/test/subscriptions/integration"
},
"message": "Received message 11111111111111111",
"ndc": "",
"sequence": 22068,
"threadId": 156,
"threadName": "Thread",
"timestamp": "2026-03-09T08:48:59.658400674Z"
},
"labels": {
"compute.googleapis.com/resource_name": "resource-name",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/managed-by": "Manager",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/name": "inference-consumer",
"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/version": "1.10.0",
"k8s-pod/manager_sh/chart": "app-0.1.0",
"k8s-pod/pod-template-hash": "789754fc8f",
"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_name": "inference-consumer",
"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_type": "Deployment"
},
"logName": "projects/test/logs/stdout",
"receiveTimestamp": "2026-03-09T08:49:02.892865366Z",
"resource": {
"labels": {
"cluster_name": "cluster",
"container_name": "app",
"location": "europe-west1",
"namespace_name": "inference",
"pod_name": "host-name",
"project_id": "test"
},
"type": "k8s_container"
},
"severity": "DEBUG",
"timestamp": "2026-03-09T08:48:59.658510174Z"
}
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Google Kubernetes Engine. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Google Kubernetes Engine on ATT&CK Navigator
AdFind Usage
Detects the usage of the AdFind tool. AdFind.exe is a free tool that extracts information from Active Directory. Wizard Spider (Bazar, TrickBot, Ryuk), FIN6 and MAZE operators have used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects
- Effort: elementary
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) Alteration
ASLR is a security feature used by the Operating System to mitigate memory exploit, attacker might want to disable it
- Effort: intermediate
Adidnsdump Enumeration
Detects use of the tool adidnsdump for enumeration and discovering DNS records.
- Effort: advanced
Advanced IP Scanner
Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
- Effort: master
Audio Capture via PowerShell
Detects audio capture via PowerShell Cmdlet
- Effort: intermediate
Autorun Keys Modification
Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Prerequisites are Logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
AzureEdge in Command Line
Detects use of azureedge in the command line.
- Effort: advanced
BITSAdmin Download
Detects command to download file using BITSAdmin, a built-in tool in Windows. This technique is used by several threat actors to download scripts or payloads on infected system.
- Effort: advanced
BazarLoader Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible BazarLoader persistence using schtasks. BazarLoader will create a Scheduled Task using a specific command line to establish its persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Bloodhound and Sharphound Tools Usage
Detects default process names and default command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound tools.
- Effort: intermediate
Blue Mockingbird Malware
Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
- Effort: elementary
CertOC Loading Dll
Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.
- Effort: intermediate
Certificate Authority Modification
Installation of new certificate(s) in the Certificate Authority can be used to trick user when spoofing website or to add trusted destinations.
- Effort: master
Certify Or Certipy
Detects the use of certify and certipy which are two different tools used to enumerate and abuse Active Directory Certificate Services.
- Effort: advanced
Change Default File Association
When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
- Effort: advanced
Clear EventLogs Through CommandLine
Detects a command that clears event logs which could indicate an attempt from an attacker to erase its previous traces.
- Effort: intermediate
Commonly Used Commands To Stop Services And Remove Backups
Detects specific commands used regularly by ransomwares to stop services or remove backups
- Effort: master
Component Object Model Hijacking
Detects component object model hijacking. An attacker can establish persistence with COM objects.
- Effort: advanced
Compression Followed By Suppression
Detects when a file is compressed and deleted.
- Effort: advanced
Container Credential Access
Adversaries could abuse containers tools to obtain credential like Kubernetes secret or Kubernetes service account access token
- Effort: intermediate
Control Panel Items
Detects the malicious use of a control panel item
- Effort: advanced
Copy Of Legitimate System32 Executable
A script has copied a System32 executable.
- Effort: intermediate
Copying Browser Files With Credentials
Detects copy of sensitive data (passwords, cookies, credit cards) included in web browsers files.
- Effort: elementary
Correlation Multi Service Disable
The rule detects a high number of services stopped or de-activated in a short period of time.
- Effort: master
DHCP Callout DLL Installation
Detects the installation of a Callout DLL via CalloutDlls and CalloutEnabled parameter in Registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DHCP server (restart required).
- Effort: intermediate
DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution
Well-known DNS exfiltration tools execution
- Effort: intermediate
DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installation
Detects the installation of a plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in Windows Registry or in command line, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required). To fully use this rule, prerequesites are logging for Registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12, 13 and 14).
- Effort: master
Data Compressed With Rar With Password
An adversary may compress data in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network, this could be done the popular rar command line program. This is a more specific one for rar where the arguments allow to encrypt both file data and headers with a given password.
- Effort: intermediate
Debugging Software Deactivation
Deactivation of some debugging softwares using taskkill command. It was observed being used by Ransomware operators.
- Effort: elementary
Default Encoding To UTF-8 PowerShell
Detects PowerShell encoding to UTF-8, which is used by Sliver implants. The command line just sets the default encoding to UTF-8 in PowerShell.
- Effort: advanced
Disable .NET ETW Through COMPlus_ETWEnabled
Detects potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. Prerequisites are logging for Registry events or logging command line parameters (both is better). Careful for registry events, if SwiftOnSecurity's SYSMON default configuration is used, you will need to update the configuration to include the .NETFramework registry key path. Same issue with Windows 4657 EventID logging, the registry path must be specified.
- Effort: intermediate
Disable Task Manager Through Registry Key
Detects commands used to disable the Windows Task Manager by modifying the proper registry key in order to impair security tools. This technique is used by the Agent Tesla RAT, among others.
- Effort: elementary
Disabled IE Security Features
Detects from the command lines or the registry, changes that indicate unwanted modifications to registry keys that disable important Internet Explorer security features. This has been used by attackers during Operation Ke3chang.
- Effort: advanced
Domain Trust Discovery Through LDAP
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. "trustedDomain" which is detected here is a Microsoft Active Directory ObjectClass Type that represents a domain that is trusted by, or trusting, the local AD DOMAIN. Several tools are using LDAP queries in the end to get the information (DSQuery, sometimes ADFind as well, etc.)
- Effort: elementary
Dynamic Linker Hijacking From Environment Variable
LD_PRELOAD and LD_LIBRARY_PATH are environment variables used by the Operating System at the runtime to load shared objects (library.ies) when executing a new process, attacker can overwrite this variable to attempts a privileges escalation.
- Effort: master
ETW Tampering
Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW Trace log which could indicate a logging evasion
- Effort: intermediate
Equation Group DLL_U Load
Detects a specific tool and export used by EquationGroup
- Effort: elementary
Exfiltration Domain In Command Line
Detects commands containing a domain linked to http exfiltration.
- Effort: intermediate
FromBase64String Command Line
Detects suspicious FromBase64String expressions in command line arguments.
- Effort: master
HackTools Suspicious Process Names In Command Line
Detects the default process name of several HackTools and also check in command line. This rule is here for quickwins as it obviously has many blind spots.
- Effort: intermediate
High Privileges Network Share Removal
Detects high privileges shares being deleted with the net share command.
- Effort: intermediate
ICacls Granting Access To All
Detects suspicious icacls command granting access to all, used by the ransomware Ryuk to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories. ICacls is a built-in Windows command to interact with the Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs) which can grand adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders.
- Effort: elementary
Inhibit System Recovery Deleting Backups
Detects adversaries attempts to delete backups or inhibit system recovery. This rule relies on differents known techniques using Windows events logs from Sysmon (ID 1), and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: intermediate
Invoke-TheHash Commandlets
Detects suspicious Invoke-TheHash PowerShell commandlet used for performing pass the hash WMI and SMB tasks.
- Effort: elementary
KeePass Config XML In Command-Line
Detects a command-line interaction with the KeePass Config XML file. It could be used to retrieve informations or to be abused for persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Lazarus Loaders
Detects different loaders used by the Lazarus Group APT
- Effort: elementary
Leviathan Registry Key Activity
Detects registry key used by Leviathan APT in Malaysian focused campaign.
- Effort: elementary
Linux Bash Reverse Shell
To bypass some security equipement or for a sack of simplicity attackers can open raw reverse shell using shell commands
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Masquerading Space After Name
This detection rule identifies a process created from an executable with a space appended to the end of the name.
- Effort: intermediate
Linux Shared Lib Injection Via Ldso Preload
Detect ld.so.preload modification for shared lib injection, technique used by attackers to load arbitrary code into process
- Effort: intermediate
Listing Systemd Environment
Detects a listing of systemd environment variables. This command could be used to do reconnaissance on a compromised host.
- Effort: advanced
Logon Scripts (UserInitMprLogonScript)
Detects creation or execution of UserInitMprLogonScript persistence method. The rule requires to log for process command lines and registry creations or update, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 1, 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: advanced
MSBuild Abuse
Detection of MSBuild uses by attackers to infect an host. Focuses on XML compilation which is a Metasploit payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Malicious Browser Extensions
Detects browser extensions being loaded with the --load-extension and -base-url options, which works on Chromium-based browsers. We are looking for potentially malicious browser extensions. These extensions can get access to informations.
- Effort: advanced
Malspam Execution Registering Malicious DLL
Detects the creation of a file in the C:\Datop folder, or DLL registering a file in the C:\Datop folder. Files located in the Datop folder are very characteristic of malspam execution related to Qakbot or SquirrelWaffle. Prerequisites are Logging for File Creation events, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 11), for the first part of the pattern (TargetFilename).
- Effort: elementary
Malware Persistence Registry Key
Detects registry key used by several malware, especially Formbook spyware in two ways, either the Sysmon registry events, or the commands line.
- Effort: master
MalwareBytes Uninstallation
Detects command line being used by attackers to uninstall Malwarebytes.
- Effort: intermediate
MavInject Process Injection
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool Mavinject32.exe (which is a LOLBAS)
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Services
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through command line and registry.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disable Using Registry
The rule detects attempts to deactivate/disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus using registry modification via command line or PowerShell scripts.
- Effort: master
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Disabled Base64 Encoded
Detects attempts to deactivate/disable Windows Defender through base64 encoded PowerShell command line or scripts.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus History Directory Deleted
Windows Defender history directory has been deleted. This could be an attempt by an attacker to remove its traces.
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Restoration Abuse
The rule detects attempts to abuse Windows Defender file restoration tool. The Windows Defender process is allowed to write files in its own protected directory. This functionality can be used by a threat actor to overwrite Windows Defender files in order to prevent it from running correctly or use Windows Defender to execute a malicious DLL.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Set-MpPreference Base64 Encoded
Detects changes of preferences for Windows Defender through command line or PowerShell scripts. Configure Windows Defender using base64-encoded commands is suspicious and could be related to malicious activities.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Defender Antivirus Signatures Removed With MpCmdRun
Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender Signatures using MpCmdRun legitimate Windows Defender executable. No signatures mean Windows Defender will be less effective (or completely useless depending on the option used).
- Effort: elementary
Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins To Export Exchange Mailbox Data
Detects PowerShell SnapIn command line or PowerShell script, often used with Get-Mailbox to export Exchange mailbox data.
- Effort: intermediate
Microsoft Office Macro Security Registry Modifications
Detects registry changes allowing an attacker to make Microsoft Office products runs Macros without warning. Events are collected either from ETW/Sysmon/EDR depending of the integration.
- Effort: master
Mimikatz Basic Commands
Detects Mimikatz most popular commands.
- Effort: elementary
Msdt (Follina) File Browse Process Execution
Detects various Follina vulnerability exploitation techniques. This is based on the Compatability Troubleshooter which is abused to do code execution.
- Effort: elementary
Mustang Panda Dropper
Detects specific process parameters as used by Mustang Panda droppers
- Effort: elementary
NTDS.dit File Interaction Through Command Line
Detects interaction with the file NTDS.dit through command line. This is usually really suspicious and could indicate an attacker trying copy the file to then look for users password hashes.
- Effort: intermediate
NetSh Used To Disable Windows Firewall
Detects NetSh commands used to disable the Windows Firewall
- Effort: advanced
Netsh Allowed Python Program
Detects netsh command that performs modification on Firewall rules to allow the program python.exe. This activity is most likely related to the deployment of a Python server or an application that needs to communicate over a network. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that enable a port forwarding between to hosts. This can be used by attackers to tunnel RDP or SMB shares for example.
- Effort: intermediate
Netsh RDP Port Forwarding
Detects netsh commands that configure a port forwarding of port 3389 used for RDP. This is commonly used by attackers during lateralization on windows environments.
- Effort: elementary
New DLL Added To AppCertDlls Registry Key
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: intermediate
Ngrok Process Execution
Detects possible Ngrok execution, which can be used by attacker for RDP tunneling.
- Effort: intermediate
NjRat Registry Changes
Detects changes for the RUN registry key which happen when a victim is infected by NjRAT. Please note that even if NjRat is well-known for the behavior the rule catches, the rule is a bit larger and could catch other malwares.
- Effort: master
Njrat Registry Values
Detects specifis registry values that are related to njRat usage.
- Effort: intermediate
NlTest Usage
Detects attempts to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities. These command lines were observed in numerous attacks, but also sometimes from legitimate administrators for debugging purposes. The rule does not cover very basics commands but rather the ones that are interesting for attackers to gather information on a domain.
- Effort: advanced
Non-Legitimate Executable Using AcceptEula Parameter
Detects accepteula in command line with non-legitimate executable name. Some attackers are masquerading SysInternals tools with decoy names to prevent detection.
- Effort: advanced
Office Application Startup Office Test
Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed everytime an Office application is started. An adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office "Office Test" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system.
- Effort: elementary
Outlook Registry Access
Detection of accesses to Microsoft Outlook registry hive, which might contain sensitive information.
- Effort: master
Pandemic Windows Implant
Detects Pandemic Windows Implant through registry keys or specific command lines. Prerequisites: Logging for Registry events is needed, which can be done in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Phorpiex DriveMgr Command
Detects specific command used by the Phorpiex botnet to execute a copy of the loader during its self-spreading stage. As described by Microsoft, this behavior is unique and easily identifiable due to the use of folders named with underscores "__" and the PE name "DriveMgr.exe".
- Effort: elementary
Phorpiex Process Masquerading
Detects specific process executable path used by the Phorpiex botnet to masquerade its system process network activity. It looks for a pattern of a system process executable name that is not legitimate and running from a folder that is created via a random algorithm 13-15 numbers long.
- Effort: elementary
PowerCat Function Loading
Detect a basic execution of PowerCat. PowerCat is a PowerShell function allowing to do basic connections, file transfer, shells, relays, generate payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
PowerShell AMSI Deactivation Bypass Using .NET Reflection
Detects Request to amsiInitFailed that can be used to disable AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) Scanning. More information about Antimalware Scan Interface https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Commands Invocation
Detects the execution to invoke a powershell command. This was used in an intrusion using Gootloader to access Mimikatz.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Data Compressed
Detects data compression through a PowerShell command (could be used by an adversary for exfiltration).
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell EncodedCommand
Detects popular file extensions in commands obfuscated in base64 run through the EncodedCommand option.
- Effort: advanced
PowerShell Invoke Expression With Registry
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell techniques to get registry key values
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 1
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: advanced
PowerView commandlets 2
Detects PowerView commandlets which perform network and Windows domain enumeration and exploitation. It provides replaces for almost all Windows net commands, letting you query users, machines, domain controllers, user descriptions, share, sessions, and more.
- Effort: master
Powershell AMSI Bypass
This rule aims to detect attempts to bypass AMSI in powershell using specific techniques.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell UploadString Function
Powershell's uploadXXX functions are a category of methods which can be used to exfiltrate data through native means on a Windows host.
- Effort: advanced
Powershell Web Request And Windows Script
Detects the use of PowerShell web request method combined with Windows Script utilities. This has been observed being used by some malware loaders.
- Effort: intermediate
Privilege Escalation Awesome Scripts (PEAS)
Detect PEAS privileges escalation scripts and binaries
- Effort: elementary
Process Memory Dump Using Comsvcs
Detects the use of comsvcs in command line to dump a specific process memory. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: intermediate
Process Memory Dump Using Rdrleakdiag
Detects the use of rdrleakdiag.exe in command line to dump the memory of a process. This technique is used by attackers for privilege escalation and pivot.
- Effort: elementary
Process Trace Alteration
PTrace syscall provides a means by which one process ("tracer") may observe and control the execution of another process ("tracee") and examine and change the tracee's memory and registers. Attacker might want to abuse ptrace functionnality to analyse memory process. It requires to be admin or set ptrace_scope to 0 to allow all user to trace any process.
- Effort: advanced
PsExec Process
Detects PsExec execution, command line which contains pstools or installation of the PsExec service. PsExec is a SysInternals which can be used to execute a program on another computer. The tool is as much used by attackers as by administrators.
- Effort: advanced
Python HTTP Server
Detects command used to start a Simple HTTP server in Python. Threat actors could use it for data extraction, hosting a webshell or else.
- Effort: intermediate
QakBot Process Creation
Detects QakBot like process executions
- Effort: intermediate
Qakbot Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Qakbot persistence using schtasks.
- Effort: intermediate
Raccine Uninstall
Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.
- Effort: elementary
Rclone Process
Detects Rclone executable or Rclone execution by using the process name, the execution through a command obfuscated or not.
- Effort: advanced
RedMimicry Winnti Playbook Registry Manipulation
Detects actions caused by the RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: elementary
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - Atera
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool Atera.
- Effort: master
Rubeus Tool Command-line
Detects command line parameters used by Rubeus, a toolset to interact with Kerberos and abuse it.
- Effort: advanced
SOCKS Tunneling Tool
Detects the usage of a SOCKS tunneling tool, often used by threat actors. These tools often use the socks5 commandline argument, however socks4 can sometimes be used as well. Unfortunately, socks alone (without any number) triggered too many false positives.
- Effort: intermediate
SSH Reverse Socks
Detects the usage of the -R option combined with StrictHostKeyChecking, which is an indication of using SSH for reverse socks.
- Effort: intermediate
Sekoia.io Activity Logs Rule Deactivation Bulk
Detects a massive rule deactivation observed threw Sekoia.io activity logs.
- Effort: master
Sigma Intelligence Windows DRILLAPP Malware
Sigma RULE to detect DrillAPP or other malicious launch of edge to disable security measures and abuse permissions.
- Effort: intermediate
Socat Relaying Socket
Socat is a linux tool used to relay local socket or internal network connection, this technics is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment such as firewall
- Effort: advanced
Socat Reverse Shell Detection
Socat is a linux tool used to relay or open reverse shell that is often used by attacker to bypass security equipment.
- Effort: elementary
Spyware Persistence Using Schtasks
Detects possible Agent Tesla or Formbook persistence using schtasks. The name of the scheduled task used by these malware is very specific (Updates/randomstring).
- Effort: intermediate
Startup Item Created
Detects when a item is added to the startup directory. An attacker can use this establish persistence.
- Effort: intermediate
Stop Backup Services
Detects adversaries attempts to stop backups services or disable Windows previous files versions feature. This could be related to ransomware operators or legit administrators. This rule relies Windows command line logging and registry logging, and PowerShell (ID 4103, 4104).
- Effort: master
Suncrypt Parameters
Detects SunCrypt ransomware's parameters, most of which are unique.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious Cmd File Copy Command To Network Share
Copy suspicious files through Windows cmd prompt to network share
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Cmd.exe Command Line
Detection on suspicious cmd.exe command line seen being used by some attackers (e.g. Lazarus with Word macros). This requires Windows process command line logging.
- Effort: master
Suspicious CommandLine Lsassy Pattern
Detects the characteristic lsassy loop used to identify lsass PIDs
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious DLL Loading By Ordinal
Detects suspicious DLL Loading by ordinal number in a non legitimate or rare folders. For example, Sofacy (APT28) used this technique to load their Trojan in a campaign of 2018.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Execution
Detects a suspicious Desktopimgdownldr execution. Desktopimgdownldr.exe is a Windows binary used to configure lockscreen/desktop image and can be abused to download malicious file.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Microsoft Defender Antivirus Exclusion Command
Detects PowerShell commands aiming to exclude path, process, IP address, or extension from scheduled and real-time scanning. These commands can be used by attackers or malware to avoid being detected by Windows Defender. Depending on the environment and the installed software, this detection rule could raise false positives. We recommend customizing this rule by filtering legitimate processes that use Windows Defender exclusion command in your environment.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Netsh DLL Persistence
Detects persitence via netsh helper. Netsh interacts with other operating system components using dynamic-link library (DLL) files. Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs.
- Effort: elementary
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters through command line logging or ScriptBlock Logging.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Specific
Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious PowerShell Keywords
Detects keywords that could indicate the use of some PowerShell exploitation framework.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious PrinterPorts Creation (CVE-2020-1048)
Detects new commands that add new printer port which point to suspicious file
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious Rundll32.exe Executions
The process rundll32.exe executes a newly dropped DLL with update /i in the command line. This specific technic was observed at least being used by the IcedID loading mechanism dubbed Gziploader. Some other detections are related to LOLBAS (Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries) usages (like the COM registering).
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Taskkill Command
Detects rare taskkill command being used. It could be related to Baby Shark malware.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious Windows Installer Execution
Detects suspicious execution of the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) which could be used to install a malicious MSI package hosted on a remote server.
- Effort: master
Suspicious certutil command
Detects suspicious certutil command which can be used by threat actors to download and/or decode payload.
- Effort: intermediate
Tactical RMM Installation
Detection of common Tactical RMM installation arguments that could be abused by some attackers.
- Effort: elementary
Tmutil Delete Backups
Detects when the utility tmutil is used to delete backups. The Time Machine utility is used to restore data from backups, add or remove exclusions, and compare backups.
- Effort: elementary
Tmutil Disabled
Detects when the utility tmutil is disabled. The Time Machine utility is used to restore data from backups, add or remove exclusions, and compare backups.
- Effort: elementary
Tmutil Exclude File From Backups
Detects when the utility tmutil is used to exclude paths from backups.
- Effort: master
UAC Bypass Via Sdclt
Detects changes to HKCU\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand by an attacker in order to bypass User Account Control (UAC)
- Effort: elementary
Usage Of Procdump With Common Arguments
Detects the usage of Procdump sysinternals tool with some common arguments and followed by common patterns.
- Effort: advanced
Usage Of Sysinternals Tools
Detects the usage of Sysinternals Tools due to accepteula key being added to Registry. The rule detects it either from the command line usage or from the regsitry events. For the later prerequisite is logging for registry events in the Sysmon configuration (events 12 and 13).
- Effort: master
Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent detection
Detects Venom Multi-hop Proxy agent.
- Effort: intermediate
WMI Install Of Binary
Detection of WMI used to install a binary on the host. It is often used by attackers as a signed binary to infect an host.
- Effort: elementary
WMIC Command To Determine The Antivirus
Detects WMIC command to determine the antivirus on a system, characteristic of the ZLoader malware (and possibly others)
- Effort: advanced
WMIC Uninstall Product
Detects products being uninstalled using WMIC command.
- Effort: intermediate
WMImplant Hack Tool
WMImplant is a powershell framework used by attacker for reconnaissance and exfiltration, this rule attempts to detect WMimplant arguments and invokes commands.
- Effort: advanced
Wdigest Enable UseLogonCredential
Detects modification of the Windows Registry value of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest\UseLogonCredential. This technique is used to extract passwords in clear-text using WDigest. The rule requires to log for Registry Events, which can be done using Sysmon Event IDs 12, 13 and 14.
- Effort: elementary
WiFi Credentials Harvesting Using Netsh
Detects the harvesting of WiFi credentials using netsh.exe.
- Effort: advanced
Windows Defender Logging Modification Via Registry
Detects when the logging for defender is disabled in the registry.
- Effort: elementary
Windows Firewall Changes
Detects changes on Windows Firewall configuration
- Effort: master
Windows Registry Persistence COM Key Linking
Detects COM object hijacking via TreatAs subkey. Logging for Registry events is needed in the Sysmon configuration with this kind of rule <TargetObject name="testr12" condition="end with">\TreatAs\(Default)</TargetObject>.
- Effort: master
Windows Sandbox Start
Detection of Windows Sandbox started from the command line with a config file or interactively using a WSB file.
- Effort: master
Wmic Process Call Creation
The WMI command-line (WMIC) utility provides a command-line interface for Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). WMIC is compatible with existing shells and utility commands. Although WMI is supposed to be an administration tool, it is wildy abused by threat actors. One of the reasons is WMI is quite stealthy. This rule detects the wmic command line launching a process on a remote or local host.
- Effort: intermediate
Wmic Service Call
Detects either remote or local code execution using wmic tool.
- Effort: intermediate
XCopy Suspicious Usage
Detects the usage of xcopy with suspicious command line options (used by Judgment Panda APT in the past). The rule is based on command line only in case xcopy is renamed.
- Effort: advanced
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Application logs |
Google Kubernetes Engine logs contains events from applications deployed in Google Cloud containers. |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | `` |
| Category | process |
| Type | change |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": "{\n \"insertId\": \"mf28fmdkt05bbyjk\",\n \"jsonPayload\": {\n \"_CAP_EFFECTIVE\": \"1ffffffffff\",\n \"_BOOT_ID\": \"e61a95dc40fd44f6ba5c6bfcb18b46a2\",\n \"_SYSTEMD_CGROUP\": \"/system.slice/containerd.service\",\n \"_PID\": \"1478\",\n \"_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID\": \"ebd8a874b9bf4797a358a0403ec7e1e7\",\n \"_EXE\": \"/usr/bin/containerd\",\n \"_TRANSPORT\": \"stdout\",\n \"_SYSTEMD_SLICE\": \"system.slice\",\n \"MESSAGE\": \"time=\\\"2022-06-01T14:01:35.371006269Z\\\" level=info msg=\\\"StopContainer for \\\\\\\"4c2b21624d4488ea8305bec91bb58135e840ab50b779da3db19ddf87864a760e\\\\\\\" with timeout 30 (s)\\\"\",\n \"_CMDLINE\": \"/usr/bin/containerd\",\n \"_STREAM_ID\": \"949cd6779ed34897a1b74883881ddfe8\",\n \"_HOSTNAME\": \"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7\",\n \"_COMM\": \"containerd\",\n \"SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER\": \"containerd\",\n \"_MACHINE_ID\": \"3fa273bf9f602a2286f55eac7ffa6d36\",\n \"_GID\": \"0\",\n \"_SYSTEMD_UNIT\": \"containerd.service\",\n \"PRIORITY\": \"6\",\n \"SYSLOG_FACILITY\": \"3\",\n \"_UID\": \"0\"\n },\n \"resource\": {\n \"type\": \"k8s_node\",\n \"labels\": {\n \"cluster_name\": \"cluster-1\",\n \"project_id\": \"hazel-aria-348413\",\n \"node_name\": \"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7\",\n \"location\": \"europe-west1-c\"\n }\n },\n \"timestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:01:35.371492Z\",\n \"logName\": \"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/container-runtime\",\n \"receiveTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:01:36.219094561Z\"\n}",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "StopContainer for \\\"4c2b21624d4488ea8305bec91bb58135e840ab50b779da3db19ddf87864a760e\\\" with timeout 30 (s)",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:01:35.371492Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "mf28fmdkt05bbyjk",
"jsonPayload": {
"MESSAGE": "time=\"2022-06-01T14:01:35.371006269Z\" level=info msg=\"StopContainer for \\\"4c2b21624d4488ea8305bec91bb58135e840ab50b779da3db19ddf87864a760e\\\" with timeout 30 (s)\"",
"SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER": "containerd",
"_BOOT_ID": "e61a95dc40fd44f6ba5c6bfcb18b46a2",
"_CAP_EFFECTIVE": "1ffffffffff",
"_COMM": "containerd",
"_GID": 0,
"_STREAM_ID": "949cd6779ed34897a1b74883881ddfe8",
"_SYSTEMD_CGROUP": "/system.slice/containerd.service",
"_SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID": "ebd8a874b9bf4797a358a0403ec7e1e7",
"_SYSTEMD_SLICE": "system.slice",
"_SYSTEMD_UNIT": "containerd.service",
"_TRANSPORT": "stdout",
"_UID": "0"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/container-runtime",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:01:36.219094561Z"
},
"host": {
"id": "3fa273bf9f602a2286f55eac7ffa6d36",
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7"
},
"log": {
"syslog": {
"facility": {
"code": 3
},
"priority": 6
}
},
"orchestrator": {
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_node"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"process": {
"command_line": "/usr/bin/containerd",
"executable": "/usr/bin/containerd",
"pid": 1478
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1-c"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"insertId\": \"17ahw8eg29q74y6\",\n \"jsonPayload\": {\n \"reportingComponent\": \"\",\n \"reason\": \"Pulling\",\n \"eventTime\": null,\n \"reportingInstance\": \"\",\n \"kind\": \"Event\",\n \"message\": \"Pulling image \\\"gke.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd:v0.11.3-gke.0\\\"\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"type\": \"Normal\",\n \"source\": {\n \"host\": \"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7\",\n \"component\": \"kubelet\"\n },\n \"metadata\": {\n \"resourceVersion\": \"954\",\n \"creationTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:30Z\",\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"managedFields\": [\n {\n \"manager\": \"kubelet\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"fieldsV1\": {\n \"f:message\": {},\n \"f:involvedObject\": {},\n \"f:lastTimestamp\": {},\n \"f:source\": {\n \"f:host\": {},\n \"f:component\": {}\n },\n \"f:type\": {},\n \"f:reason\": {},\n \"f:count\": {},\n \"f:firstTimestamp\": {}\n },\n \"operation\": \"Update\",\n \"fieldsType\": \"FieldsV1\",\n \"time\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:30Z\"\n }\n ],\n \"uid\": \"658b3d26-ed26-4d32-a5b4-3bb87bdefa99\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6.16f48435f72a4bd9\"\n },\n \"involvedObject\": {\n \"resourceVersion\": \"6551\",\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"fieldPath\": \"spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6\",\n \"uid\": \"52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf\",\n \"kind\": \"Pod\"\n }\n },\n \"resource\": {\n \"type\": \"k8s_pod\",\n \"labels\": {\n \"location\": \"europe-west1-c\",\n \"namespace_name\": \"kube-system\",\n \"cluster_name\": \"cluster-1\",\n \"pod_name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6\",\n \"project_id\": \"hazel-aria-348413\"\n }\n },\n \"timestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:30Z\",\n \"severity\": \"INFO\",\n \"logName\": \"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events\",\n \"receiveTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z\"\n}",
"event": {
"action": "Pulling",
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Pulling image \"gke.gcr.io/prometheus-to-sd:v0.11.3-gke.0\"",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74y6",
"jsonPayload": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"involvedObject": {
"fieldPath": "spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}",
"kind": "Pod",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"resourceVersion": "6551",
"uid": "52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf"
},
"kind": "Event",
"metadata": {
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {},
"f:host": {}
},
"f:type": {}
},
"manager": "kubelet",
"operation": "Update",
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:30Z"
}
],
"resourceVersion": "954",
"uid": "658b3d26-ed26-4d32-a5b4-3bb87bdefa99"
},
"source": {
"component": "kubelet"
},
"type": "Normal"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z",
"severity": "INFO"
},
"host": {
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7"
},
"orchestrator": {
"api_version": "v1",
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"namespace": "kube-system",
"resource": {
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"type": "k8s_pod"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1-c"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"insertId\": \"17ahw8eg29q74yc\",\n \"jsonPayload\": {\n \"eventTime\": null,\n \"reportingInstance\": \"\",\n \"type\": \"Warning\",\n \"reportingComponent\": \"\",\n \"metadata\": {\n \"resourceVersion\": \"960\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns.16f484369d214dae\",\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"uid\": \"828b8cd3-1eec-4093-95fb-907ebeab0efa\",\n \"creationTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:33Z\",\n \"managedFields\": [\n {\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"operation\": \"Update\",\n \"fieldsV1\": {\n \"f:firstTimestamp\": {},\n \"f:involvedObject\": {},\n \"f:reason\": {},\n \"f:count\": {},\n \"f:lastTimestamp\": {},\n \"f:type\": {},\n \"f:message\": {},\n \"f:source\": {\n \"f:component\": {}\n }\n },\n \"manager\": \"kube-controller-manager\",\n \"time\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:33Z\",\n \"fieldsType\": \"FieldsV1\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"kind\": \"Event\",\n \"message\": \"Failed to update endpoint kube-system/kube-dns: Operation cannot be fulfilled on endpoints \\\"kube-dns\\\": the object has been modified; please apply your changes to the latest version and try again\",\n \"source\": {\n \"component\": \"endpoint-controller\"\n },\n \"involvedObject\": {\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"uid\": \"75cc3b54-2a5f-42fa-8dd9-1669695113cd\",\n \"kind\": \"Endpoints\",\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"resourceVersion\": \"7416\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns\"\n },\n \"reason\": \"FailedToUpdateEndpoint\"\n },\n \"resource\": {\n \"type\": \"k8s_cluster\",\n \"labels\": {\n \"cluster_name\": \"cluster-1\",\n \"location\": \"europe-west1-c\",\n \"project_id\": \"hazel-aria-348413\"\n }\n },\n \"timestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:33Z\",\n \"severity\": \"WARNING\",\n \"logName\": \"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events\",\n \"receiveTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z\"\n}",
"event": {
"action": "FailedToUpdateEndpoint",
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Failed to update endpoint kube-system/kube-dns: Operation cannot be fulfilled on endpoints \"kube-dns\": the object has been modified; please apply your changes to the latest version and try again",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74yc",
"jsonPayload": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"involvedObject": {
"kind": "Endpoints",
"name": "kube-dns",
"resourceVersion": "7416",
"uid": "75cc3b54-2a5f-42fa-8dd9-1669695113cd"
},
"kind": "Event",
"metadata": {
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {}
},
"f:type": {}
},
"manager": "kube-controller-manager",
"operation": "Update",
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:33Z"
}
],
"resourceVersion": "960",
"uid": "828b8cd3-1eec-4093-95fb-907ebeab0efa"
},
"source": {
"component": "endpoint-controller"
},
"type": "Warning"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z",
"severity": "WARNING"
},
"host": {
"name": "kube-dns.16f484369d214dae"
},
"orchestrator": {
"api_version": "v1",
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"namespace": "kube-system",
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_cluster"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1-c"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\n \"insertId\": \"17ahw8eg29q74yb\",\n \"jsonPayload\": {\n \"involvedObject\": {\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"uid\": \"52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf\",\n \"kind\": \"Pod\",\n \"resourceVersion\": \"6551\",\n \"fieldPath\": \"spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6\"\n },\n \"kind\": \"Event\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"eventTime\": null,\n \"reportingInstance\": \"\",\n \"metadata\": {\n \"managedFields\": [\n {\n \"time\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:32Z\",\n \"manager\": \"kubelet\",\n \"fieldsType\": \"FieldsV1\",\n \"operation\": \"Update\",\n \"apiVersion\": \"v1\",\n \"fieldsV1\": {\n \"f:count\": {},\n \"f:type\": {},\n \"f:involvedObject\": {},\n \"f:source\": {\n \"f:component\": {},\n \"f:host\": {}\n },\n \"f:reason\": {},\n \"f:firstTimestamp\": {},\n \"f:message\": {},\n \"f:lastTimestamp\": {}\n }\n }\n ],\n \"namespace\": \"kube-system\",\n \"creationTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:32Z\",\n \"name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6.16f48436899e3f4a\",\n \"resourceVersion\": \"959\",\n \"uid\": \"2836bb34-8703-4475-a7d8-5cf0ec2232f8\"\n },\n \"message\": \"Created container prometheus-to-sd\",\n \"reason\": \"Created\",\n \"type\": \"Normal\",\n \"source\": {\n \"host\": \"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7\",\n \"component\": \"kubelet\"\n },\n \"reportingComponent\": \"\"\n },\n \"resource\": {\n \"type\": \"k8s_pod\",\n \"labels\": {\n \"project_id\": \"hazel-aria-348413\",\n \"namespace_name\": \"kube-system\",\n \"cluster_name\": \"cluster-1\",\n \"pod_name\": \"kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6\",\n \"location\": \"europe-west1-c\"\n }\n },\n \"timestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:32Z\",\n \"severity\": \"INFO\",\n \"logName\": \"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events\",\n \"receiveTimestamp\": \"2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z\"\n}",
"event": {
"action": "Created",
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Created container prometheus-to-sd",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "17ahw8eg29q74yb",
"jsonPayload": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"involvedObject": {
"fieldPath": "spec.containers{prometheus-to-sd}",
"kind": "Pod",
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"resourceVersion": "6551",
"uid": "52017f74-5157-4788-a62e-b83c4eac4acf"
},
"kind": "Event",
"metadata": {
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {},
"f:host": {}
},
"f:type": {}
},
"manager": "kubelet",
"operation": "Update",
"time": "2022-06-01T14:05:32Z"
}
],
"resourceVersion": "959",
"uid": "2836bb34-8703-4475-a7d8-5cf0ec2232f8"
},
"source": {
"component": "kubelet"
},
"type": "Normal"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-01T14:05:39.683992581Z",
"severity": "INFO"
},
"host": {
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-476246ab-wnl7"
},
"orchestrator": {
"api_version": "v1",
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"namespace": "kube-system",
"resource": {
"name": "kube-dns-56494768b7-544n6",
"type": "k8s_pod"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1-c"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"insertId\":\"32ez47f5wz17i\",\"jsonPayload\":{\"apiVersion\":\"v1\",\"eventTime\":null,\"involvedObject\":{\"kind\":\"Node\",\"name\":\"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf\",\"uid\":\"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf\"},\"kind\":\"Event\",\"message\":\"{\\\"unmanaged\\\": {\\\"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_buckets\\\": \\\"32768\\\"}}\",\"metadata\":{\"creationTimestamp\":\"2022-06-15T01:55:51Z\",\"managedFields\":[{\"apiVersion\":\"v1\",\"fieldsType\":\"FieldsV1\",\"fieldsV1\":{\"f:count\":{},\"f:firstTimestamp\":{},\"f:involvedObject\":{},\"f:lastTimestamp\":{},\"f:message\":{},\"f:reason\":{},\"f:source\":{\"f:component\":{},\"f:host\":{}},\"f:type\":{}},\"manager\":\"node-problem-detector\",\"operation\":\"Update\",\"time\":\"2022-06-15T01:55:51Z\"}],\"name\":\"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf.16f8813a8514b8c0\",\"namespace\":\"default\",\"resourceVersion\":\"894\",\"uid\":\"7e26b736-331a-4896-961f-96688918ba7e\"},\"reason\":\"NodeSysctlChange\",\"reportingComponent\":\"\",\"reportingInstance\":\"\",\"source\":{\"component\":\"sysctl-monitor\",\"host\":\"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf\"},\"type\":\"Warning\"},\"logName\":\"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events\",\"receiveTimestamp\":\"2022-06-15T01:55:52.012275121Z\",\"resource\":{\"labels\":{\"cluster_name\":\"cluster-1\",\"location\":\"europe-central2-a\",\"node_name\":\"gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf\",\"project_id\":\"hazel-aria-348413\"},\"type\":\"k8s_node\"},\"severity\":\"WARNING\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-06-15T01:55:51Z\"}",
"event": {
"action": "NodeSysctlChange",
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "{\"unmanaged\":{\"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_buckets\":\"32768\"}}",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "32ez47f5wz17i",
"jsonPayload": {
"apiVersion": "v1",
"involvedObject": {
"kind": "Node",
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf",
"uid": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf"
},
"kind": "Event",
"metadata": {
"creationTimestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z",
"managedFields": [
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"fieldsType": "FieldsV1",
"fieldsV1": {
"f:count": {},
"f:firstTimestamp": {},
"f:involvedObject": {},
"f:lastTimestamp": {},
"f:message": {},
"f:reason": {},
"f:source": {
"f:component": {},
"f:host": {}
},
"f:type": {}
},
"manager": "node-problem-detector",
"operation": "Update",
"time": "2022-06-15T01:55:51Z"
}
],
"resourceVersion": "894",
"uid": "7e26b736-331a-4896-961f-96688918ba7e"
},
"source": {
"component": "sysctl-monitor"
},
"type": "Warning"
},
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-15T01:55:52.012275121Z",
"severity": "WARNING"
},
"host": {
"name": "gke-cluster-1-default-pool-eb66079e-k3zf"
},
"orchestrator": {
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"namespace": "default",
"resource": {
"type": "k8s_node"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-central2-a"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"insertId\":\"1wtrhknf2gg14w\",\"logName\":\"projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events\",\"receiveTimestamp\":\"2022-06-16T09:42:59.259491841Z\",\"resource\":{\"labels\":{\"cluster_name\":\"cluster-1\",\"location\":\"europe-central2-a\",\"project_id\":\"hazel-aria-348413\"},\"type\":\"k8s_cluster\"},\"severity\":\"WARNING\",\"textPayload\":\"Event exporter started watching. Some events may have been lost up to this point.\",\"timestamp\":\"2022-06-16T09:42:39.200653463Z\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "Event exporter started watching. Some events may have been lost up to this point.",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-16T09:42:39.200653Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "hazel-aria-348413"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "1wtrhknf2gg14w",
"logName": "projects/hazel-aria-348413/logs/events",
"receiveTimestamp": "2022-06-16T09:42:59.259491841Z",
"severity": "WARNING"
},
"orchestrator": {
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-1"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-central2-a"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"insertId\":\"1111111111111111\",\"jsonPayload\":{\"additional\":{\"pixyl-analysis-id\":\"analysis-1111111-1\"},\"context\":\"default\",\"logger\":\"ai.gleamer.inference.core.wlm.ReaderThread.pixyl_loggers.loggers.GleamerJSONFormatter\",\"message\":\"{1: 1}\",\"thread\":\"W-8081-Thread-stdout\"},\"labels\":{\"compute.googleapis.com/resource_name\":\"gtest-resource\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/managed-by\":\"Manager\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/name\":\"test-integration-eu-3-3-0\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/version\":\"3.3.0\",\"k8s-pod/gleamer_ai/connector-name\":\"test-integration-eu\",\"k8s-pod/gleamer_ai/connector-version\":\"3.3.0\",\"k8s-pod/manager_sh/chart\":\"app-0.1.0\",\"k8s-pod/pod-template-hash\":\"1111111111\",\"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_name\":\"test-integration-eu-3-3-0\",\"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_type\":\"Deployment\"},\"logName\":\"projects/test/logs/stdout\",\"receiveTimestamp\":\"2026-03-09T08:20:46.852786133Z\",\"resource\":{\"labels\":{\"cluster_name\":\"cluster-primary\",\"container_name\":\"app\",\"location\":\"europe-west1\",\"namespace_name\":\"connector\",\"pod_name\":\"test-integration-eu-3-3-0-1111111111-hq6kl\",\"project_id\":\"test\"},\"type\":\"k8s_container\"},\"severity\":\"INFO\",\"timestamp\":\"2026-03-09T08:20:43.016224684Z\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "\"{1: 1}\"",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2026-03-09T08:20:43.016224Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "test"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "1111111111111111",
"logName": "projects/test/logs/stdout",
"receiveTimestamp": "2026-03-09T08:20:46.852786133Z",
"severity": "INFO"
},
"orchestrator": {
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster-primary"
},
"namespace": "connector",
"resource": {
"name": "test-integration-eu-3-3-0-1111111111-hq6kl",
"type": "k8s_container"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1"
}
}
}
{
"message": "{\"insertId\":\"1111111111111111\",\"jsonPayload\":{\"hostName\":\"host-name\",\"loggerName\":\"logger.test.Integration\",\"mdc\":{\"messageId\":\"11111111111111111\",\"subscription\":\"projects/test/subscriptions/integration\"},\"message\":\"Received message 11111111111111111\",\"ndc\":\"\",\"sequence\":22068,\"threadId\":156,\"threadName\":\"Thread\",\"timestamp\":\"2026-03-09T08:48:59.658400674Z\"},\"labels\":{\"compute.googleapis.com/resource_name\":\"resource-name\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/managed-by\":\"Manager\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/name\":\"inference-consumer\",\"k8s-pod/app_kubernetes_io/version\":\"1.10.0\",\"k8s-pod/manager_sh/chart\":\"app-0.1.0\",\"k8s-pod/pod-template-hash\":\"789754fc8f\",\"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_name\":\"inference-consumer\",\"logging.gke.io/top_level_controller_type\":\"Deployment\"},\"logName\":\"projects/test/logs/stdout\",\"receiveTimestamp\":\"2026-03-09T08:49:02.892865366Z\",\"resource\":{\"labels\":{\"cluster_name\":\"cluster\",\"container_name\":\"app\",\"location\":\"europe-west1\",\"namespace_name\":\"inference\",\"pod_name\":\"host-name\",\"project_id\":\"test\"},\"type\":\"k8s_container\"},\"severity\":\"DEBUG\",\"timestamp\":\"2026-03-09T08:48:59.658510174Z\"}",
"event": {
"category": [
"process"
],
"reason": "\"Received message 11111111111111111\"",
"type": [
"change"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2026-03-09T08:48:59.658510Z",
"cloud": {
"project": {
"id": "test"
}
},
"google_kubernetes_engine": {
"insertId": "1111111111111111",
"logName": "projects/test/logs/stdout",
"receiveTimestamp": "2026-03-09T08:49:02.892865366Z",
"severity": "DEBUG"
},
"orchestrator": {
"cluster": {
"name": "cluster"
},
"namespace": "inference",
"resource": {
"name": "host-name",
"type": "k8s_container"
},
"type": "kubernetes"
},
"server": {
"geo": {
"name": "europe-west1"
}
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
cloud.project.id |
keyword |
The cloud project id. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.reason |
keyword |
Reason why this event happened, according to the source |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
google_kubernetes_engine.insertId |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.MESSAGE |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._BOOT_ID |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._CAP_EFFECTIVE |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._COMM |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._GID |
number |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._STREAM_ID |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._SYSTEMD_CGROUP |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._SYSTEMD_INVOCATION_ID |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._SYSTEMD_SLICE |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._SYSTEMD_UNIT |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._TRANSPORT |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload._UID |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.apiVersion |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.eventTime |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.involvedObject.fieldPath |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.involvedObject.kind |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.involvedObject.name |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.involvedObject.resourceVersion |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.involvedObject.uid |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.kind |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.metadata.creationTimestamp |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.metadata.managedFields |
array |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.metadata.resourceVersion |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.metadata.uid |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.reportingComponent |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.reportingInstance |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.source.component |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.jsonPayload.type |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.labels.authorization.k8s.io.decision |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.logName |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.receiveTimestamp |
keyword |
|
google_kubernetes_engine.severity |
keyword |
|
host.id |
keyword |
Unique host id. |
host.name |
keyword |
Name of the host. |
log.syslog.facility.code |
long |
Syslog numeric facility of the event. |
log.syslog.priority |
long |
Syslog priority of the event. |
orchestrator.api_version |
keyword |
API version being used to carry out the action |
orchestrator.cluster.name |
keyword |
Name of the cluster. |
orchestrator.namespace |
keyword |
Namespace in which the action is taking place. |
orchestrator.resource.name |
keyword |
Name of the resource being acted upon. |
orchestrator.resource.type |
keyword |
Type of resource being acted upon. |
orchestrator.type |
keyword |
Orchestrator cluster type (e.g. kubernetes, nomad or cloudfoundry). |
process.command_line |
wildcard |
Full command line that started the process. |
process.executable |
keyword |
Absolute path to the process executable. |
process.pid |
long |
Process id. |
server.geo.name |
keyword |
User-defined description of a location. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.